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Abstract
Two studies investigated how values affect competitive versus cooperative behavior. Each Study presented a new social-dilemma
game, in which participants’ interpretations of the dilemma (i.e., their subjective payoff matrix)—and consequently the dominant
(i.e., rational) behavioral choice—depended on their values. The Paired Charity Game (Study 1) framed the situation in terms of
cooperation. As hypothesized, contribution correlated positively with universalism and benevolence values that reflect concern
for others and negatively with power, achievement, and hedonism values that promote self-interests. Furthermore, values, but not
traits, predicted the participants’ contribution. The Group Charity Game (Study 2) was designed to frame the situation in terms of
competition. As hypothesized, contribution correlated positively with emphasizing benevolence over power values. Moreover, the
impact of values was stronger when they were rendered accessible, indicating a causal influence of values on behavior.
Furthermore, when their value hierarchy was rendered accessible, participants explained their choices in terms of those values
that were (a) important to them and (b) relevant to the situation. The findings thus point to the mechanism through which
accessible values affect behavior. Taken together, the studies promote our understanding of the value–behavior relationships, by
highlighting the impact of values on perception. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Suppose you are a sales person in a telemarketing team. You
are paid according to the number of calls you make per day. A
co-worker who just joined your team asks for your help and
advice. By taking the time to help, you increase her chances of
performing well and thus contributing to the overall
performance of your team. At the same time, however, the
time spent means fewer calls for you, and a direct decease in
your own salary. Furthermore, the new team member, using
your knowledge and tips, may improve and eventually out-
perform you. By keeping your knowledge to yourself you can
maintain your high status in the team. Should you help? The
answer depends on what is important to you in life. If success
and social status are most important, you may view helping
your co-worker as an obstacle to personal success. Refraining
from helping would be the reasonable decision in this case. In
contrast, if caring about others is most important to you, you
may perceive this situation as an opportunity to express such
care, and thus helping would be the rational choice.
Competition and cooperation are integral parts of most
interpersonal and intergroup encounters. When people interact
with others they frequently have to decide whether to
cooperate with them, often at some cost for themselves, or
to compete, possibly at the expense of others. We employ
Schwartz’s (1992) theory of personal values to explain
individuals’ competitive versus cooperative behavior in social
dilemma settings. We reason that because values affect the
interpretation of social dilemmas, the rational behavior in a
dilemma of competition versus cooperation depends on the
values important to her. We present two empirical studies that
investigate the relationships between values and competitive/
cooperative choice in a social dilemma game: Study 1 indicates
that the behavior depends on one’s values, above and beyond
one’s personality traits. Study 2 tests the causal relationship
between values and choice of cooperative versus competitive
behavior.
Past research on competition and cooperation usually
focused on situational factors, such as the framing of the
situation (Brewer & Kramer, 1986), the saliency of social
categorization (e.g., Wit & Kerr, 2002), interpersonal
communication, (e.g., Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk,
2004) and group size (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; De
Cremer & Leonardelli, 2003). Fewer studies investigated the
impact of stable individual differences, such as social motives
(e.g., Van Lange, 1999), and personality traits, as addressed
below.
The current research examines how personal values are
related to competitive versus cooperative behavior in two new
social-dilemma games. Studying interpersonal (Study 1) and
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intergroup (Study 2) conflicts, both games were designed to
create unambiguous situations that allow for the attainment of
certain values (i.e., value-relevant situations). Because values
represent broad goals that are stable across time and situations,
studying their impact on competition versus cooperation could
deepen our understanding of these behaviors and the individuals
that are likely to endorse them.Whereas previous studies usually
focused on few personal attributes (i.e., one or two traits or
motives), the current research examines the full set of values,
thus studying the full spectrum of motivational goals.
Moreover, we investigate not only the relationships between
values and competition/cooperation, but also some of the
mechanisms through which values affect behavior.
The Nature of Personal Values
Values are trans-situational goals that vary in importance and
serve as guiding principles in people’s lives (Kluckhohn, 1951;
Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). They differ from other
personal attributes in several ways. First, values transcend
specific situations. This feature distinguishes them from
norms, attitudes, and specific goals, which usually refer to
specific actions, objects, or situations (Schwartz, 1992).
Second, values may serve as standards or criteria and provide
social justification for choices and behaviors, distinguishing
them from traits, interests, and orientations (Bilsky &
Schwartz, 1994; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002;
Sagiv, 2002). Third, unlike traits and motives, values are
inherently desirable and they must be represented cognitively
in ways that enable people to communicate about them
(Roccas et al., 2002). Fourth, values are ordered by subjective
importance, forming a unique system of value hierarchies
(Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Finally, most behaviors
have implications for multiple values. Hence, it is the tradeoff
among competing values that is assumed to guide behavior
(Schwartz, 1992, Tetlock, 1986). To understand and predict
behavior, it is thus important to consider the full spectrum of
values (Schwartz, 1996).
To conceptualize and measure values, we use Schwartz’s
theory of personal values, which has been tested in cross-
cultural research in more than 200 samples from over 65
countries (Schwartz, 1992, 2005), and is considered the central
theory of personal values (for reviews of value theories see
Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). The theory suggests
that values differ in the motivational goals to which they are
directed. Schwartz identified 10 value types that form a
circular structure. The distinctiveness of the 10 values and their
structural relations has been verified in the vast majority of the
samples studied. The dynamic relationships among the 10
value types can be summarized as two basic conflicts: The first
conflict is between openness to change (self-direction and
stimulation) and conservation (tradition, conformity, and
security) values. The second conflict, which is of more
relevance to this research contrasts self-enhancement (Power,
achievement, and Hedonism1) versus self-transcendence
(benevolence and universalism) values. We elaborate on these
conflicts below.
Values and Behavior
As guiding principles in people’s lives, values are expected to
affect people’s behavior. Past research provides rich evidence
for the relations between values and behavior. Values were
found systematically related to daily behaviors as well as
major life choices (a review in Roccas & Sagiv, in press). Few
studies investigated the mechanisms through which values are
related to behavior. Studying hypothetical social dilemmas,
Feather (1995) showed that values predict the valence
attributed to each behavioral alternative, which in turn predicts
the person’s choice. Thinking of the reasons that specific
values are important increased the strength of the relations
between values and behavior (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Allen,
2001; Karremans, 2007). In a pioneering study, Verplanken
and Holland (2002) demonstrated causality in the relation
between values and behavior and showed that when
experimentally primed to be highly accessible, values
predicted value-congruent behavior.
The current research promotes our understanding of the
relations between values and behavior, by highlighting the
impact of values on perception. Values affect individuals’
perception and interpretation of situations and events (Gandal,
Roccas, Sagiv, & Wrzesniewski, 2005; Schwartz, Sagiv, &
Boehnke, 2000; see also research on might versus morality,
e.g., Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989). In
two empirical studies we investigated how values affect
competitive versus cooperative behavioral choices. Each Study
presents a new social dilemma game, in which participants’
interpretations of the dilemma (i.e., their subjective payoff
matrix)—and consequently the dominant (i.e., rational)
behavioral choice—depend on their values. In both studies,
the cooperative behavior is costly and conflicts with the
competitive action that promotes self-interests. The studies
thus deepen our understanding of actual behavior when two
conflicting motivations are highlighted. We further show that
values affect competitive/cooperative behavior above and
beyond the effects of traits (Study 1), that increasing the
accessibility of individuals’ full value hierarchy enhances the
impact of values on behavior, and that when their values are
highly accessible, individuals explain their behavior in the
terms of the values they emphasize (Study 2).
STUDY 1
Values in Social Dilemmas
Past research showed that emphasizing self-transcendence
values predicted pro-social behavior such as donating money
(Maio & Olson, 1995), acting to promote donations to charity
(Joireman & Duell, 2007), engaging in daily pro-social actions
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003), and behaving in ways that others
describe as benevolent and honest (Lönnqvist, Leikas,
Paunonen, Nissinen, & Verkasalo, 2006). The current research
studied the impact of values on cooperation versus competition
in social dilemmas—where individuals have to choose
between pro-self and pro-social action.
Cooperative versus competitive decisions in social dilemma
games have been related to social value orientations (SVO).
Values and SVO are conceptually and empirically related. The
1Hedonism values also share elements of openness to change versus conserva-
tion values.
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two constructs also differ in some important ways2. Only a few
studies explored the role of basic, trans-situational values in
competitive and cooperative behavior (Garling, 1999; Probst,
Carnevale, & Triandis, 1999). Important limitations seem to
cloud the contribution of these studies. In one study behavior
was hypothetical: Participants were asked to imagine a social
dilemma and state how they would act (Garling, 1999). In
another study (Probst et al., 1999) the payoff structure of the
games created a vague situation in which it was not clear
whether contribution reflected competition or cooperation:
Participants could cooperate with ingroup members, while
simultaneously competing with outgroup members, and vice
versa. Also, values were measured at the end of the study, after
the decision to compete or cooperate. It could thus be a result
of the behavior rather than its cause (cf. Bem, 1972). Studies
that manipulated participants’ perceptions of the frequency of
value-related behaviors showed these perceptions affect
subsequent value reports (e.g., Salancik & Conway, 1975).
Study 1 was designed to overcome these limitations and
expand our knowledge of the ways in which values impact
competitive versus cooperative behavior in social dilemma
situations. For that aim, we introduce a new dilemma game,
The Paired Charity Game, whose payoff structure was
designed to have a different subjective valence for different
participants, depending on their personal values. Specifically,
it was designed so that competing would be the ‘‘rational’’
decision for individuals who emphasize values that reflect self-
enhancement and promotion of self-interests; and at the same
time, cooperating would be the ‘‘rational’’ decision for those
who emphasize values that reflect concern for others and
transcendence over self-interest. Below we present the game
and derive our hypotheses.
The Paired Charity Game
The Paired Charity Game is played in pairs. Each player
receives NIS15 (about $3.50) and has to decide whether to
contribute the money to her partner (i.e., cooperate), or keep it
for herself (i.e., compete). If player A decides to cooperate, she
ends up with NIS15 when her partner chooses to cooperate as
well (i.e., contributes his money) or she ends up with no money
if her partner decides to compete (i.e., refrains from
contributing). If player A decides to compete and save her
money, she ends up with NIS30 or NIS15 if her partner
cooperates or competes, respectively. In addition, for each
player who contributes, the researcher donates another NIS15
to a social cause chosen by the player. Thus, by contributing
the NIS15, the player gives up the money she was given, but
ensures her favorite social institute or charity gets the same
amount. Panel A of Table 1 presents the payoff matrix of the
game.
The perceived payoff structure in this game depends on the
subjective valence of the donation. Consider first the case
where the indirect gain resulting from donation to the social
cause has no valence for the player. The dominant (‘‘rational’’)
decision in this case is to compete and refrain from
contributing: If Player B competes, player A ends up with
her original NIS15 (whereas she ends up with nothing if she
contributes). If player B contributes, player A ends up with
NIS30 if she competes, compared to NIS15 if she contributes.
Thus, regardless of her partner’s decision, player A gains by
competing (i.e., keeping her NIS15).
Table 1. Payoff matrices of the paired charity game and of the group charity game
Panel A: The paired charity game
Decision of A Gave the money Kept the money
Decision of B
Gave the money 15 þdonation (15) 30
15 þdonation (15) 0 þdonation (15)
Kept the money 0 þdonation (15) 15
30 15
Panel B: The group charity game
Final game result
Decision of participant
Ingroup won and its
pool has >$80






its pool has >$80
Did not contribute Getting total sum collected
from 3 groups / 40
Total sum collected
from three groups
contributed to social cause
Total sum collected
from three groups
goes to an outgroup
Contributed Getting total sum collected







goes to an outgroup
2Whereas personal values and social value orientations (SVO) both reflect
motivation and are empirically related (Joireman & Duell, 2005), the two
constructs differ in important ways. First, values are broad, transituational
goals, whereas SVOs are measured by preferences for specific types of
resource allocations (e.g., Samuelson, 1993; Van Lange, 1999). Moreover,
although SVOs are viewed as motives, they are inferred from specific patterns
of behavior. Values, in contrast, are inferred from individuals’ reports of their
guiding principles in life. Values are thus de-contextualized measures, and are
closer to the phenomenological experience of endorsing major life-goals and
motivations. Indeed, personal values are recognized as broader and more
general (Joireman & Duell, 2007). Finally, values, but not SVOs, have been
studied in a large variety of cultures around theworld and found to have similar
meanings across cultures.
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The picture is quite different, however, when the indirect
gain resulting from donation has high valence for the
participant. If the value of donation is at least as high as the
value of having the same amount for herself, Player A faces a
different payoff structure, because in her perspective her gain
is the sum of what she has and what has been donated due to
her decision. If Player B decides to keep the money (i.e.,
compete), then Payer A has NIS15 for herself if she competes
as well, or she has NIS15 donated to her favorite social cause if
she contributes. If Player B cooperates, Player A has NIS30 for
herself plus NIS15 donated to her partner’s cause, if she
competes, and NIS15 for herself plus NIS30 donated to both
their causes if she cooperates. Thus, if the donation has the
same value as money for herself, Player A ends up with the
same gains whether she competes or cooperate. If she values
donating more than having the same amount for herself, then
contributing results in a greater gain. In this case the dominant
(‘‘rational’’) decision for Player A is to contribute.
We postulate that personal values will impact the subjective
valence of donating versus keeping the money, and will
therefore predict the decision to cooperate or compete in the
game. Self-enhancement values reflect the motivation to
promote one’s own interests: To gain power and control over
other people and resources (power), to strive for competence
and success (achievement), and to gain personal gratification
(hedonism). Emphasizing these values is consistent with
attributing greater worth to personal gain than to the welfare of
others, and is therefore likely to result in a decision to compete.
We thus expect that emphasizing power, achievement, and
hedonism values will negatively predict contributing the
money. We expect stronger correlations for power values that
promote one’s own interests even at the expense of others.
Competing in the game is a clear way to attain this goal.
In contrast, self-transcendence values reflect the motivation
for concern and care for close others (benevolence) and for
acceptance, tolerance, and care for all people and for nature
(universalism). Emphasizing these values is consistent with
attributing high valence to thewelfare of others, and therefore to
contributing in the game. By making a decision to contribute in
the game, individuals can attain their important goals, because
theyexpress concern, care, and loyalty toward their partner in the
game; and because cooperating allows them to contribute to a
social cause important to them, thus helping societal members
who are weaker and more in need than they are. We therefore
expect that emphasizing benevolence and universalism values
will positively predict contribution in the game.
H1a: The decision to contribute in the game (i.e., to
cooperate) will correlate positively with emphasizing
benevolence and universalism values, and negatively with
emphasizing power, and to a lesser extent, achievement and
hedonism values.
An Integrative Hypothesis
The circular structure of the relations among the 10 value types
allows for the development of an integrative hypothesis.
Specifically, if a variable (in this case, cooperative behavior)
correlates most positively with one type of values (i.e.,
benevolence and universalism values) and most negatively
with another (i.e., power), then the expected pattern of
correlations with all other values should correspond with the
circular value structure: The strength of the correlations should
decrease from strongest to weakest in both directions around
the circle (Roccas et al., 2002; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995).
Generating an integrated hypothesis deepens our under-
standing of the relations between values and cooperation
versus competition, and decreases the chance of random
findings. Moreover, when a whole pattern of associations is
predicted, even non-significant correlations provide mean-
ingful information.
H1b: Based on our analysis above, we propose the
following order of hypothesized correlations. Ranked from
the most positive (10) to the most negative (1): benevolence
(9.5); universalism (9.5); tradition (8); conformity (7);
security (6); self- direction, (5); stimulation (4); hedonism
(3) achievement (2); power (1)3.
Values and Traits
We reasoned above that values are likely to affect behavioral
choices in social dilemma games. As stable individual
attributes, however, values are inherently confounded with
other stable individual differences such as traits, interests, and
motives. The role of values in influencing behavior is therefore
difficult to disentangle. In the current study we attempt to show
that values impact competitive versus cooperative behavior
independently of possible effects of personality traits. Traits
are ‘‘dimensions of individual differences in tendencies to
show consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions’’
(McCrae & Costa, 1990, p. 23). Stable personality traits are
reflected in individual action and have implications for
behavior in numerous social settings (e.g., a review in Barry &
Stewart, 1997). The five-factor model (FFM) is the dominant
trait model. It aims at comprehensiveness of the main trait
factors, and lists five basic factors that describe most
personality traits: Neuroticism, openness to experience,
extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.
Previous studies have found correlations between person-
ality traits and cooperative versus competitive behavior in
conflict situations. Thus, for example, in interpersonal
negotiation individuals low on agreeableness preferred power
assertion techniques more than those high on agreeableness
(Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996). Cooperation in a
resource dilemma game correlated positively with agreeable-
ness and negatively with extraversion (Koole, Jager, Van den
Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001). Taking a somewhat different
approach, Wolfe & Kasmer (1988) found that the sociability
facet of extraversion predicted preference for cooperative
activities, whereas the impulsivity facet of extraversion
predicted preference for competitive activities.
Previous studies found consistent correlations between
traits and values (a review in Roccas et al., 2002). It is thus
possible that traits and values are confounded in their impact
on cooperative/competitive behavior. Roccas et al. (2002)
suggested that even though traits and values are consistently
related, they are conceptually distinct constructs, and are likely
3Contribution is expected to correlate equally positively with universalism and
benevolence values. Therefore, both are rated 9.5 (the average of 9 and 10, see
Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995).
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to impact different types of behavior. Specifically, they
suggested that since values represent motivational goals, they
are relevant to goal-directed acts. Values are hence likely to
predict better than traits behaviors over which one has some
cognitive control or choice, and can reflect, deliberate, and
plan. Conversely, traits should predict better than values
spontaneous, intuitive, and emotionally driven actions over
which individuals have little cognitive control.
The decision to compete or cooperate in social dilemma
situations involves deliberation and reflection, and entails
some cognitive control. Because individuals have to choose
between competing and cooperating, they are likely to
consider their options and make a reasoned decision. Such
a decision is likely to reflect the motivational goals they expect
to attain by their actions (i.e., their values) even when
individuals do not consider their values explicitly. We
therefore hypothesize that
H2: Values will predict contribution in the Paired Charity




Participants were 46 undergraduate business students (22
women; 18 men, 6 did not report; mean age¼ 22.67 years),
enrolled in an introductory psychology course at an Israeli
university. Participation was anonymous and voluntary.
Procedure
The study was conducted in two sections of the same
introductory psychology course, taking place on the same day.
It was conducted during class time, as part of a session on
‘‘stable individual differences in organizations.’’ It contained
two parts, which were presented as two separate studies: One
on personality attributes and the other on interpersonal
processes. To match the materials of the ‘‘two studies’’ we
used a personal 4-digit code. For the ‘‘first’’ study, participants
completed values and traits questionnaires. They then received
the materials for the ‘‘second’’ study. For the second part of the
study, the experimenter gave each student a numbered
envelope containing a card with the same number as the
one on the envelope and NIS15 (about $3.50). The participants
were asked to take the numbered card from their envelope and
save it for later use. The experimenter explained that they
would participate in a ‘‘game’’ in pairs. They would not know
who their partner is, but that s/he is a fellow student who has a
card with a number that matched their own.
The researcher then introduced the game as follows: ‘‘Each
of you got NIS15, so now you and your partner each have
NIS15. You now have to decide what to do with that money.
You can decide to keep it to yourself or you can decide to give
it to your partner. The money is yours, and if you decide to
keep it for yourself, you will be able to do whatever you like
with it. If you decide to give it to your unknown partner, he or
she will get the money and will be able to do whatever they
want with it. In addition, the researchers will donate NIS15 to a
social cause of your choosing. Later you will fill out a
questionnaire in which you can choose among several options
for donating the money. Please note that you cannot choose to
give only some of the money. You need to choose between
keeping or giving it all.’’
The researcher presented the matrix of the four possible
outcomes of the game (see Panel A of Table 1). The
participants completed a questionnaire regarding the decision
they had to make (see below). Once they made their decision,
they were asked to raise their hands and wait. Participants who
raised their hands were asked to wait in line to execute their
decision. Each of them in turn approached a ballot box. To
ensure privacy and anonymity, the ballot box stood behind a
screen. Participants put their envelopes—either containing
NIS15 or empty—into the box, returned to their seats, and
completed a post-decision questionnaire. The instructor
reminded them to keep their numbered cards and hand in
their questionnaires.
After both sessions of the game had ended, the experimenters
grouped together each pair of envelopes that had matching
numbers and calculated the amount each participant should be
paid. For each envelope containing money, the researchers
donated NIS15 to the cause the participant had chosen. The
participants were debriefed during the next class. They were paid
by an assistant unconnected with the course and were informed
about the overall amounts donated to each charity.
Instruments
Values
The participants’ values were assessed by Schwartz Value
Survey (SVS, Schwartz, 1992). The 57 value items in the
questionnaire had been sampled to cover all ten types of
values. Each single value is followed by a short explanatory
phrase in parentheses (e.g., WEALTH [material possessions,
money]). Participants rated the importance of each value as a
guiding principle in their life on a nine-point scale from
‘‘opposed to my principles’’ (1), through ‘‘not important’’
(0), to ‘‘of supreme importance’’ (7). The asymmetry of the
scale reflects the natural distribution of distinctions that
individuals make when thinking about the importance of
values to them, observed during scale construction. Because
values are typically seen as desirable, they generally range
from somewhat to very important. The standard indexes
recommended by Schwartz (1992) were used to measure the
priority given to each value type. Internal reliabilities (alphas)
of the ten indexes ranged from .51 to .78, which is in the typical
range for values (see Schmitt, Schwartz, Steyer, & Schmitt,
1993).
Traits
To measure personality traits, we used Saucier’s (1994) short
version of Goldberg’s (1992) five-factor questionnaire (the
Mini-Markers). The instrument consists of eight adjectives
measuring each of the five factors (total of 40 adjectives), each
answered on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (very
uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (very characteristic of me). The
internal reliabilities were satisfactory for openness (a¼ .76),
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extroversion (a¼ .84), conscientiousness (a¼ .73), and
neuroticism (a¼ .67). The reliability of agreeableness was
unsatisfactory (.49). An index based on five of the items
yielded better reliability (.63). The correlations of agreeable-
ness (measured either with the standard or with the 5-item
index) with values replicated earlier findings (Roccas et al.,
2002). The correlations of agreeableness with the participant’s
decision in the game, and the pattern of correlations of
agreeableness with the other traits, were very similar when
measured either way; the correlation with the decision being
slightly stronger with the standard index. Below we report
findings for the standard index. Using the 5-item index does
not change any of our conclusions.
Pre-Decision Questionnaire
To assure that the rules of the game were clear, the participants
were asked to explain the possible results of the game. They
then reported their thoughts and feelings regarding the possible
decisions, in an open response format and on a checklist (these
data were not analyzed in the present study).
Behavioral Decision
The participants reported their decision in twoways: First, they
marked which one of the options they would ‘‘probably
choose’’ on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (‘‘keeping the
money for myself’’) to 4 (‘‘I can’t decide’’) to 7 (‘‘donation of
the money’’). They then reported their final decision of
whether or not to contribute their money. The two measures
correlated highly (r¼ .97, p< .001). Finally, the participants
marked one of six social causes, to which they would like the
researcher to donate money in their names. The six causes
included organizations protecting the environment, animal
rights, sexually abused women, physically and mentally
abused children, and foreign workers.
RESULTS
Thirty nine (85%) participants contributed their NIS15 to their
partners, and 7 did not. We hypothesized that personal values
would predict the decision of whether to contribute or not.
Table 2 presents the correlations between values and
contribution. As hypothesized, the decision to contribute
correlated positively with emphasizing universalism (r¼ .32;
p< .01) and benevolence values (r¼ .25; p¼ .05) and
negatively with emphasizing power (r¼.38; p< .01)
hedonism (r¼.27; p< .05) and achievement values
(r¼.25; p< .05, all one-tailed).
Because the decision of whether to compete or cooperate
was dichotomous, we conducted a logistic regression analysis
to further test our hypotheses. Because the value types
hypothesized to correlate with the decision are conceptually
and empirically interrelated, entering all of them to the
regression equation would create a multicolinearity problem.
We therefore computed an index measuring self-enhancement
versus self-transcendence values by subtracting the average of
benevolence and universalism values from the average of
power, achievement, and hedonism values. When entered to
the logistic regression equation, this variable had a significant
effect on the likelihood of competing versus cooperating in the
paired charity game. Specifically, the odds of respondents’
keeping their money increased significantly by a factor of 3.40
for every unit increase in their values (Wald¼ 6.49; p< .02).
The findings thus support our first hypothesis.
Unexpectedly, the decision to contribute correlated
positively with emphasizing tradition values (r¼ .47;
p< .01, in a logistic regression Wald¼ 7.23; p< .01).
Tradition values reflect a commitment to past rituals and
customs, and submission to abstract authorities (e.g., religion).
Contribution to charity is often encouraged by religious
institutions (Regnerus, Smith & Sikkink, 1998), and could be
seen as a way to attain the goals reflected by tradition values.
To test our integrative hypothesis we correlated the predicted
order of correlations between each value and cooperation, with
the observed order and strength of correlations, finding support
for the integrative hypothesis (rspearman¼ .91, rpearson¼ .89,
both p< .01).
We further hypothesized that the impact of values on the
decision to compete or cooperate would be stronger than that
of traits. To assess the overall impact of values versus traits on
the cooperation decision, we used a hierarchical regression
analysis in which the dependent variable was the decision
measured by a continuous scale. When entered into the
regression equation at the first step, the five personality traits
had no effect on contribution (Adjusted R2¼.03, F
change¼ .71, ns.). Self-enhancement versus self-transcen-
dence values were added in the second step, explaining 14% of
the variance in contribution (F change¼ 6.63; p< .05). When
added at the third step, tradition values explained an additional
9% of the variance (F change¼ 5.10; p< .05)4. Thus, the
findings fully supported our second hypothesis.


















Openness to experience .04
Notes: For all correlations with values, individual differences in scale use were
controlled by partialing out each respondent’s mean rating of all values, as
recommended in Schwartz (1992). p< .05; p< .01 one-tailed.
4A hierarchical logistic regression on the binary choice yielded very similar
findings. We report the linear regression which provides information about the
overall variance explained.
Values competition and cooperation 69
Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 64–77 (2011)
DISCUSSION
The findings of Study 1 supported our hypotheses. The
importance participants attributed to self-enhancement versus
self-transcendence values substantially predicted their compe-
tition versus cooperation. Moreover, whereas values affected
contribution, personality traits had no significant effect on it.
This finding is consistent with the claim made by Roccas et al.
(2002) that values predict behavior better than traits when
behavior is goal-related and cognitively controlled. The decision
in the current study was largely cognitively controlled:
Participants were encouraged to consider their possible
decisions, and to reflect about the possible outcomes of each
decision. In past research personality traits (mainly agreeable-
ness and extraversion) were found related to cooperative versus
competitive behavior. That traits had no effect on the decision
made in this study may reflect the crucial role that cognitive
deliberation had in the design of Study 1. The previous studies
may have been conducted under conditions of minimal cognitive
control that are more likely to be affected by traits (Roccas et al.,
2002). Given the small sample of Study 1, however, caution is
required in interpreting the lack of impact of traits.
The vast majority of participants in Study 1 chose to
cooperate with their unknown partner and contributed the
money they received. This strong tendency to cooperate may
be due to the multiple motives that promoted cooperation in the
game (e.g., helping their partner, contributing to charity).
Importantly, these motives all reflect self-transcendence
values. The high percentage of cooperation may also reflect
the framing of the game, which was mostly in terms of
contribution: Participants were handed an amount of money,
and they could either donate it or not. Thus, although
participants chose whether to cooperate, the game lacked
strong elements of competition. To increase the external
validity of our findings, Study 2 presents a different game,
which frames the situation in terms of competition. In addition,
this game focuses on a narrower motive for cooperation versus
competition.
We reasoned that values influence competitive/cooperative
behavior by affecting the valence of each decision and thus
highlighting the decision that allows for the attainment of
important motivational goals. This reasoning was not tested
directly, however. Moreover, the correlational nature of Study
1 does not allow for causal inference. Study 2 was designed to
overcome these limitations as well: We investigate the process
through which values affect the cooperative/competitive
behavior by exploring the effect of values’ accessibility on
the relations of values to behavior, and by directly examining
the role of values in the perception of the situation and of the
decision made. Moreover, Study 2 tests the causal effect of
values hierarchy on competitive/cooperative behavior.
STUDY 2
The main goal of Study 2 was to test the influence of values on
competition versus cooperation in a way that allows for causal
inference. To that aim, we investigate the role of value
accessibility in affecting the impact of values on cooperative/
competitive behavior. We further aimed to take another step
toward understanding the mechanism through which values
affect behavior by studying the explanations participants
provide for their decision. Finally, we introduce a different
social dilemma game, framed in terms of competition.
The Group Charity Game
Like the Paired Charity Game, the Group Charity Game was
designed to create clear value-congruent behavioral altern-
atives. Participants are assigned to one of three 40-people
groups. Each group has the task of building up a pool of money
to which the participant could contribute any amount between
zero and five dollars, resulting in a potential pool size ranging
from $0 to $200. At the end of the experiment, the group with
the most money in its pool would receive the money from all
three pools. The sumwould be split equally among thewinning
group’s members, regardless of whether or how much, each
member contributed. However, to qualify as a winner, the
group must not only have accumulated the most money, but
this sum must at least equal $80. If none of the groups met the
$80 criterion, none would win and the money would be
donated to a social cause, determined by the preference of the
greatest number of the participants. Panel B of Table 1 presents
the payoff matrix.
The Group Charity Game was designed to highlight the
competition aspect of the situation. It is a competition between
groups, one of which is the player’s ingroup. Introducing the
intergroup competition increases the competition aspect of the
game and frames the situation mainly in terms of competition
(in contrast to the Paired Charity Game, which highlighted the
elements of contribution and framed the situation mainly in
terms of cooperation). In addition, this game highlights the
possible gains from competing and the cost of cooperating. To
further increase the perceived costs of cooperation, partici-
pants were asked to contribute their own money to their group
pool. Contributing their ownmoney is likely to be perceived by
participants as more costly than contributing money that was
just handed to them by the experimenter (as in Study 1) without
any effort or cost on their part.
This game avoids the ambiguity about whether the
participants’ behavior was competitive or cooperative which
exists in the Inter-group Prisoner Dilemma game played in
previous studies (e.g., Probst et al., 1999, see above). In the
current game, individuals could ‘‘free ride’’ and enjoy a
possible win without contributing: Should their group win,
they would enjoy the profit without contributing (and thus do
better than outgroup members and ingroup members who
contributed). In case their group lost, or came short of $80, they
did not lose anything because they had not contributed. Thus,
refraining from contribution serves to attain the goals of self-
enhancement values5. Because the competitive behavior is not
only about winning, but also about beating others, it is more
compatible with power values than with achievement or
hedonism values, which emphasize self-interest, but not
outdoing others.
5Contributing to increase in-group’s chances to win is rational only if this
contribution changes the group’s status from lose to tie or from tie to win. This
is unlikely with 40 members in each group, who could contribute 0–5$. None
of the participants mentioned this possibility in explaining of their choice, nor
during debriefing.
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In contrast, those who emphasize benevolence values are
likely to attain their goals by donating to their ingroup money
pool. By contributing, participants cooperate with their in-
group, thus expressing kindness, loyalty, and help. Moreover,
should their group lose, there is a substantial chance that the
money will go to a deserving social cause. Contribution in this
game is therefore highly compatible with benevolence values
that reflect concern and care for ingroup members. It is less
compatible with universalism values, that reflect concern for
all, because contribution to the ingroup serves to distinct
between concern for ingroup and for outgroup members. We
therefore hypothesize that:
H1a: Participants who attribute greater importance to
benevolence values and less importance to power values
will contribute more money to their group’s pool than those
who attribute less importance to benevolence and more
importance to power.
H1b: Integrative hypothesis. We propose the following
order of correlations, ranked from the most positive (10) to
the most negative (1): benevolence (10); universalism (9);
tradition (8); conformity (7); security (6); self- direction (5),
stimulation (4); hedonism (3) achievement (2); power (1).
Causal Effects of Values
Another main goal of Study 2 was to test the causality of the
relations between values and contribution. The study was
designed to allow for causal inference by using cognitive
priming procedures. As numerous studies in social cognition
have shown, any knowledge structure is likely to exert more
influence on individuals’ judgments and behaviors when it is
highly accessible in memory than when it is not (see Higgins,
1996, for a review). Values are typically assumed to be
available in the sense that they are stored in memory (e.g.,
Schwartz, 1992). When accessible, values may direct attention
to features in the situation that provide opportunities for goal
attainment, thus guiding people to perceive situations as
occasions for value-relevant action. Hence, a manipulation of
the temporary accessibility of values can serve as a test of their
causal influence, an approach that has been used in addressing
the causal influence of other individual difference variables
(for a review, see Schwarz, 1987).
Previous studies found a stronger relationship between
values and behaviors for individuals who values were
chronically accessible (e.g., Assor, 1998; Bardi, 1998). In
the current study we manipulated the temporary accessibility
of the participants’ values and predicted that values would
affect the cooperation/competition choice more when they
were rendered highly accessible. Cognitive priming was used
to manipulate temporary accessibility of values and examine
its impact on behavior previously (Roccas, 2003; Roccas,
Schwartz, & Amit, in press; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). In
these studies, the researchers primed one type of values—
either explicitly or implicitly—and showed that individuals
acted in ways compatible with that value type—to the extent
that it was central or important for them. In the current study
we took a somewhat different approach, priming the entire
hierarchy of personal values. In everyday life, it is often the
hierarchy among various important values that influences
choices and behavior. Rendering the whole value hierarchy
highly accessible allows us to maintain the relative importance
of each value and examine how tradeoffs between values
predict the competitive/cooperative behavior.
The experiment had two parts. In the first, participants
completed several questionnaires, including the value instru-
ments. Two weeks later, they came back to the laboratory and
participated in the Group Charity Game. Half of the
participants reported their values (again) immediately prior
to playing the game (high temporary accessibility), whereas
the others first played the game, and then reported their values
(low temporary accessibility). Importantly, in both conditions,
we assessed participants’ values using the questionnaires they
completed 2 weeks prior to the game. The second
questionnaire served only to render values accessible. After
deciding whether, and how much, of their own money they
would like to contribute to their group (contribution decision)
the participants were asked to explain their decision. We
therefore hypothesized that:
H2: The impact of values on the cooperative/competitive
behavior will be stronger when participants’ values are
rendered temporarily accessible than when they are not.
The Mechanism Relating Accessible Values to Behavior
When value hierarchies are accessible, they are likely to direct
attention to those features in the situation that allow for the
attainment of important values and goals. Hence, in explaining
their choices, participants should be likely to refer mainly to
the values important to them, and this tendency should be more
pronounced when the value hierarchies are rendered highly
accessible (i.e., in the high-accessibility condition). Thus,
while Study 1 assumed that individuals are influenced by their
values in interpreting a situation and making a behavioral
choice, Study 2 directly investigated this mechanism. We
hypothesized that:
H3: Participants will explain their decisions in terms
involving their dominant values, in particular when these
values have been rendered temporarily accessible.
METHODS
Participants and Design
Eighty one undergraduates (49 women; 32 men; mean
age¼ 19.57 years) enrolled in introductory psychology
courses at a Midwestern university participated in this study.
All were European-Americans. The experiment followed a 3
(values: high in power; high in benevolence; mixed) 2 (value
accessibility: high; low) factorial between-participants design.
Participants were randomly assigned to the accessibility
condition, whereas the values factor reflects individual
differences, as assessed 2 weeks prior to the experiment.
Procedure
Two weeks prior to the actual experiment, all participants
completed the SVS and a number of other questionnaires.
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Participants were assigned to the high-in-benevolence-values,
high-in-power-values, and mixed-values conditions based on
their SVS scores in this first session (see below). For the
experiment proper, participants came to the lab individually.
They were informed that they would be playing a game, which
was introduced as follows. Each participant is assigned to one
of three groups of 40 members. Each group has a money pool,
to which the participant can choose to contribute any amount
between $0 and $5 of his or her own money. At the end of the
game, the group with the most money in its pool—provided
that it has at least $80—wins the game. The winning group
receives the money from all three pools to be split equally
among all its members, regardless of how much, if at all, they
contributed. If no group reaches the $80 criterion, the money
will be donated to a cause chosen by the largest number of
participants.
Before making their decisions, participants were presented
with several examples of possible outcomes, to verify their
understanding of the game and its rules. Next, participants
decided how much they wanted to contribute to their group’s
pool (contribution decision). Participants were asked to
explain their decisions (see below). To manipulate the
temporary accessibility of their values, half of the participants
completed the SVS before they played the game (high
accessibility), whereas the other half completed it after they
played the game (low accessibility). At the end of experimental
session, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Donations
Following the completion of the study, the experimenter
counted participants’ cash contributions. No group reached the
$80 criterion6. Hence, the money was donated to the cause
chosen by the largest number of participants. Most participants
(80%) chose to donate to ‘‘a charity organization’’; 13% and
7% chose ‘‘environmental organizations’’ or ‘‘research,’’
respectively. Thus, all contributions (a total of $146) were
donated to United Way.
Instruments
Values
The participants’ values were assessed with the same
questionnaire used in Study 1. One value (‘‘being a parent’’)
was added, for a total of 58 items. The same questionnaire was
used in the pre-experimental and experimental sessions, as
described above. Indexes of the importance of each value type
were computed by averaging the importance ratings of the
specific values representative of that type. Internal reliabilities
(as) were .75 for power and .73 for benevolence.
Explanations
After the participants made their contribution decision, they
were asked to explain their decision in an open response
format. We created two indices for the content of participants’
explanations for their contribution decision, namely an index
of explanations that fit benevolence goals (expressions like
contribution, charity, help, improve someone’s condition), and
an index of explanations that fit power goals (expressions like
win, profit, loss, self-interest). To validate this list, the first
author prepared a list of value-related words and expressions
that participants had included in their explanations. The list
was presented to three judges, all experts in value theory and
blind to the goals of the present research. For each word, the
judges were asked whether it could represent benevolence or
power values. We included in the index words and expressions
that all three judges agreed on. On each index, participants
received a score of 1 if at least one of the words above was used




As expected, contribution in the Group Charity Game
correlated positively with benevolence values (r¼ .22,
p< .05 one-tailed) and negatively with power values
(r¼.36, p< .005, one-tailed). Unexpectedly, but consistent
with the findings of Study 1, contribution also correlated
positively with tradition values (r¼ .30, p< .01). To test our
integrative hypothesis we correlated the hypothesized order of
correlations between each value type and the decision to
cooperate with the observed order and strength of correlations.
The findings provide support for the integrative hypothesis
(rspearman¼ .81, rpearson¼ .83, both p< .01).
Values, Accessibility and Contribution
Participants’ Value Profiles
We assigned participants to the different value conditions on
the basis of their value profiles, assessed 2 weeks prior to the
experiment. Previous research indicated a universal tendency
to endorse benevolence values more strongly than power
values: Surveying teachers and students from 56 countries
Schwartz and Bardi (2001) found that, on average, bene-
volence values ranked the most important and power values
ranked among the least important. Consistent with these
findings, our participants endorsed benevolence values more
strongly (M¼ 4.95) than power values (M¼ 2.28)7.
We aimed to create experimental groups that include
individuals who strongly endorsed either benevolence or
power values, and to achieve a division of the sample into three
groups of roughly similar size. Thus, we considered not only
the ratings of benevolence and power values, but also the gap
between them. Specifically, we assigned participants to the
high benevolence group when their mean rating of bene-
volence values (a) was higher than 5.00 and (b) exceeded their
ratings of power values by at least 3 scale points. We assigned
6Since the total number of participants in the study was less then 120, the
amounts contributed were weighted for 40 members in each group.
7The difference in favor of benevolence values was greater than found in Study
1. This is consistent with findings that business students (Study 1) emphasize
power more and benevolence less than psychology students (e.g., Sagiv &
Schwartz, 2000).
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participants to the high power group when (a) their mean rating
of power values was higher than 3.00, and (b) their mean rating
of benevolence values was less than 3 points higher than their
rating of power values. All remaining participants were
assigned to the mixed group. Below we report the data for all
three values groups but test the key hypotheses with planned
contrasts for participants who emphasize benevolence or
power values, respectively.
Values, Accessibility and Contribution Decision
To test our hypotheses we conducted a 3 2 ANOVA (value
group accessibility condition). We first tested the main effect
of values. We then conducted a series of planned contrasts to
test the hypothesized interaction effect and the simple effects
that explain it (for the advantage of using focused test (i.e.,
contrasts) see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). We examined (1)
whether participants high in benevolence contributed more
when their values were rendered highly accessible than when
they were not, and (2) whether participants high in power
contributed less in the high than in the low accessibility
condition. We also examined whether the impact of values was
stronger in the high accessibility condition (3) than in the low
accessibility condition (4). Finally, we tested an interaction
contrast (5).
Likelihood of Contributing
The top panel of Table 3 shows the percentage of participants
who decided to contribute any money to their group’s pool.
Overall, participants who emphasized benevolence values
were twice as likely to contribute (85.7%) than participants
who emphasized power values (41.7%), with mixed values
participants falling in between (55.2%); F(2,75)¼ 6.42,
p¼ .003, for the main effect of participants’ value orientation.
As predicted, rendering participants’ values accessible
increased the percentage of contributors among participants
emphasizing benevolence from 71.4 to 100%, t(75)¼ 1.66,
p¼ .05, one-tailed, for the planned contrast. This manipulation
decreased the percentage of contributors among participants
emphasizing power from 50 to 30%, although this difference
was not significant (75)¼ 1.06, ns. Finally, the difference
between participants assigned to the benevolence or power
conditions was reliable in the high accessibility condition.
t(75)¼ 3.71, p< .0005, one-tailed, but not in the low
accessibility condition, t(75)¼ 1.24, ns. This pattern of results
is reflected in a significant interaction of value orientation (the
two extreme groups) and value accessibility, t(75)¼ 1.90,
p< .05, one-tailed.
Average Contributions
The second panel of Table 3 shows participants’ average
contributions as a function of experimental condition. As
hypothesized, a 3 2 ANOVA (value orientation accessibil-
accessibility) yielded a significant main effect for values;
F(2,75)¼ 7.78, p< .001. Overall, participants who emphasized
benevolence values contributed more money (M¼ $2.29) than
those who emphasize power values (M¼ $0.71), with partici-
pants who reported mixed values falling in between (M¼ 1.28).
Planned contrasts indicate that participants who empha-
sized benevolence values contributed more when their values
were rendered accessible (M¼ $2.79) than when they were not
(M¼ $1.79); t(75)¼ 1.81, p< .05, one-tailed. Similarly,
participants who emphasized power values tended to
contribute less under high (M¼ $0.50) than under low
(M¼ $0.86) accessibility conditions, although this difference
was insignificant, t< 1. Again, the difference between the
power and benevolence value conditions was more pro-
nounced when the participants’ values were rendered
accessible, t(75)¼ 3.78, p< .00005, one-tailed, than when
they were not, t(75)¼ 1.68, p< .05, one-tailed. This pattern is
reflected in an interaction of value orientation and accessi-
bility, t(75)¼ 1.66, p¼ .05, one-tailed.
Contributions Exceeding $2
Given that participants were told that each group had 40
members, the groups could reach the $80 criterion if each
member contributed $2. Contributions that exceed $2 therefore
indicate an altruistic decision to contribute more than the
‘‘fair’’ share. Overall, 39.3% of the participants high in
benevolence contributed more than $2, whereas only 4.2% of
the participants high in power values did so, with mixed-values
participants falling in between (20.7%); F(2,75)¼ 5.16,
p< .008 for the main effect of values. Participants high in
benevolence values were somewhat more likely to contribute
more than $2 when their values were rendered accessible
Table 3. Participant’s contribution as a function of value profiles and experimental condition.
Value profile High power Mixed High benevolence
A. Likelihood of Contributing (Proportions)
All sample 41.7% (n¼ 24) 55.2% (n¼ 29) 85.7% (n¼ 28)
Low accessibility 50% (n¼ 14) 50% (n¼ 12) 71.4% (n¼ 14)
High accessibility 30% (n¼ 10) 59% (n¼ 17) 100% (n¼ 14)
B. Average Contributions (in dollars)
All sample .71 (n¼ 24) 1.28 (n¼ 29) 2.29 (n¼ 28)
Low accessibility .86 (n¼ 14) 1.42 (n¼ 12) 1.79 (n¼ 14)
High accessibility .50 (n¼ 10) 1.18 (n¼ 17) 2.79 (n¼ 14)
C. Contributions exceeding $2 (Proportions)
All sample 4% (n¼ 24) 21% (n¼ 29) 39% (n¼ 28)
Low accessibility 7% (n¼ 14) 33% (n¼ 12) 28% (n¼ 14)
High accessibility 0% (n¼ 10) 12% (n¼ 17) 50% (n¼ 14)
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(50%) than when they were not (28.6%), although this
difference was insignificant, t(75)¼ 1.43, ns. Conversely,
participants high in power values were insignificantly less
likely to contribute more than $2 when their values were
rendered accessible (0%) than when they were not (7.1%),
t< 1. Again, the difference between those high in benevolence
or power values was more pronounced under high,
t(75)¼ 3.06, p< .0006, one-tailed, than under low accessi-
bility conditions, t(75)¼ 1.43, ns. However, the predicted
interaction was insignificant, t(75)¼ 1.29, ns.
Perception of the Situation as an Underlying
Mechanism Relating Values to Behavior
We reasoned that when accessible, values lead individuals to
identify those features in the situation that allow for the
attainment of their important goals. We therefore hypothesized
that in explaining their behavior, participants would refer to
features of the situation that reflect their dominant values.
Specifically, we reasoned that participants high in benevolence
values would explain their decision in terms of benevolence
concepts (e.g., help, contribution to others, charity), whereas
participants high in power values would explain their decision
in terms of power concepts (e.g., profit, loss, self-interest). We
hypothesized that this pattern would be more pronounced
under the high-accessibility condition.
Recall that participants received a score of 1 on the
‘‘benevolence concept’’ index, and a score of 1 on the ‘‘power
concept’’ index, when their explanation mentioned any
benevolence or power concept, respectively. Table 4 shows
the relevant data. Overall, participants high in benevolence
values were more likely to mention benevolence concepts
(M¼ .64) than were participants high in power values
(M¼ .30), with mixed-value participants falling in between
(M¼ .36); F (2,75)¼ 4.39, p< .02, for the value main effect.
Unexpectedly, participants were equally likely to mention
power concepts regardless of value orientation, F(2,75)< 1.
As hypothesized, participants who emphasized benevo-
lence values were more likely to mention benevolence
concepts in the high-accessibility condition (M¼ .86) than
in the low-accessibility condition (M¼ .43), t(75)¼ 2.52,
p< .01. Conversely, participants in the high-power group were
less likely to explain their decision in terms of benevolence
concepts in the high than in the low-accessibility condition
(M¼ .00 vs. .54), t(75)¼ 2.85, p< .003. This pattern is
reflected in a significant interaction, t(75)¼ 3.81, p< .001.
Finally, participants in the high-power group tended more to
explain their contribution in terms of power concepts in the
high-accessibility condition (M¼ .70) than in the low-
accessibility condition (M¼ .15). t(75)¼ 2.83, p< .003.
Conversely, participants in the high-benevolence groups were
somewhat less likely to explain this decision in terms of power
concepts in the high-accessibility condition (M¼ .36) than in
the low-accessibility condition (M¼ .50), t(75) F< 1. This
pattern is again reflected in a significant interaction,
t(75)¼ 2.65, p< .005. Thus, as hypothesized, the findings
indicate that people understand social situations in terms of
their important values. When the hierarchy of their values was
highly accessible, individuals thought of the social dilemma
game—and explained their decision of whether to compete or
cooperate—in terms of those values that were more important
to them.
To further explore the role of explaining the behavior in
terms of values, we repeated the 3 2 (value group acces-
accessibility condition) ANOVA analysis, and added as two
covariates the explanation of the behavior in terms of
benevolence (0¼ no, 1¼ yes) and in terms of power values
(0¼ no, 1¼ yes). The covariate for ‘‘benevolence terms’’
predicted choice significantly (F¼ 19.81), whereas the
covariate of ‘‘power terms’’ was insignificant (F¼ 1.86).
The main effect of values on contribution was significant
(F¼ 3.69; p¼ .03) but weaker than in the original analysis
(F¼ 7.78; p< .001, see above). Thus, it seems that using
benevolence values terms to account for the behavior partly
explains the effect of values on contribution.
DISCUSSION
The findings of Study 2 indicate that individuals’ values
influenced their behavior in the Group Charity social-dilemma
game. Participants who emphasized benevolence values were
more likely than those who emphasized power values to
cooperate rather than compete with others. Specifically, they
were more likely to make a contribution; they contributed a
larger sum on average, and they were more likely to contribute
beyond their ‘‘fair’’ share (i.e., $2).
These observations alone, however, do not necessarily
indicate a causal influence of values. To address this issue, we
manipulated the temporary accessibility of participants’
values. As hypothesized, the impact of values on the behavior
was more pronounced when the participants’ values were
rendered highly accessible. Participants who emphasized
benevolence values were more likely to make some
contribution, were more likely to contribute more than their
fair share (i.e., $2), and contributed more on average under
high than under low accessibility conditions. In contrast,
participants who emphasized power values were somewhat
less likely to make any contribution, were less likely to
contribute more than their fair share, and contributed less on
Table 4. Using benevolence and power terms in explanations of contribution decision as influenced by value profile and experimental
condition.
Explanation
Benevolence terms Power terms
High power Mixed High benevolence High power Mixed High benevolence
All sample .30 (n¼ 24) .36 (n¼ 29) .64 (n¼ 28) .39 (n¼ 24) .32 (n¼ 29) .43 (n¼ 28)
Low accessibility .54 (n¼ 13) .42 (n¼ 12) .43 (n¼ 14) .15 (n¼ 13) .08 (n¼ 12) .50 (n¼ 14)
High accessibility .00 (n¼ 10) .31 (n¼ 17) .86 (n¼ 14) .70 (n¼ 10) .50 (n¼ 17) .36 (n¼ 14)
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average under high than under low accessibility conditions.
These differences, however, were weaker and insignificant.
The asymmetry in the effects of accessibility on power
versus benevolence values may reflect the fact that participants
in the power group tended to attribute fairly high importance to
benevolence values as well. These participants emphasized
power more than others and benevolence less than others—but
some of them rated benevolence as more important to them
than power. One could argue that rendering their personal
value hierarchy accessible could have lead these participants to
act on their benevolence values and contribute.
However, rendering their value hierarchy highly accessible
served to activate the importance participants attributed to both
benevolence and power values. We reason that the ‘‘trans-
lation’’ from values to behavior depends on the nature of the
behavior in question. In the current study, contribution
conflicted with promoting self-interests and entailed monetary
cost. It is therefore likely that a small ‘‘amount’’ of importance
attributed to power values was enough to lead a person to
refrain from contributing, whereas a much larger ‘‘amount’’ of
benevolence values was required to yield contribution. Thus,
we suggest that it is the importance attributed to values
relatively to others that predict behavior. Indeed, the pattern of
results for the ‘‘high power’’ group in Study 2 was consistent
with our hypothesis. The weak effects could be alternatively
explained, at least partially, by a floor effect (see below).
Overall, the findings of Study 2 provide strong support for
the impact of values on behavior. Interestingly, values
predicted contribution even in the low accessibility condition.
Thus, although accessibility plays an important role in the
relationships between values and behavior, values may affect
behavior even without being rendered accessible. This may
indicate that for some people, important values are chronically
accessible (Assor, 1998; Bardi, 1998;). Alternatively, this
finding may indicate that values affect behavior automatically,
even without explicit cognitive awareness (Sagiv & Schwartz,
1995). Future research could further explore these processes.
The effect of values on behavior even in the low
accessibility condition is an intriguing finding. It limits,
however, the strengths of the accessibility effect, because it
creates a ceiling (for benevolence values) or a floor effect (for
power values). Thus, for example, in the low accessibility
condition, 71% of those in the high benevolence group
contributed some amount. As hypothesized, the proportion
was higher in the high accessibility condition. In fact, all
(100%) participants high in benevolence contributed in this
condition. Nevertheless, because so many contributed in the
low accessibility condition, the increase yielded an effect only
one-tailed significant.
Finally, Study 2 took a first step toward understanding the
mechanism through which accessible values affect behavior.
When their values were highly accessible to them, participants
who emphasized benevolence values used mainly benevolence
terms (e.g., contribution, helping others, charity) to explain
their decision, whereas those who emphasized power values
used mainly power terms (e.g., profit, wining, self-interests). In
contrast, the participants’ explanations were not significantly
connected with their values under the low-accessibility
condition. Interestingly, the accessibility effects were stronger
when values predicted the explanation for the behavior, than
when they predicted the behavior. This is consistent with the
idea that while acting according to one’s values is possible
even when these values are not temporarily accessible,
explaining the behavior in terms of values is possible only
to the extent that they are highly accessible.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We investigated the impact of values on the perception and
behavioral choice in cooperation versus competition dilem-
mas. We employ an integrative value framework to predict
behavioral patterns in two new social-dilemma games that
simulate interpersonal (Study 1) and intergroup (Study 2)
conflict. Overcoming some limitations of past research, the
two games were designed to provide unambiguous situations
in terms of the values that could be attained by competing or
cooperating. The Paired Charity Game (Study 1) framed the
conflict situation in terms of cooperation—by donating the
money given to them participants could contribute to others.
Contribution correlated positively with universalism and
benevolence values that emphasize concern and care for
others, and negatively with self-enhancement values (power,
achievement, and hedonism) that promote the interest of the
self. The Group Charity Game (Study 2) was designed to frame
the situation in terms of competition. It highlighted
participants’ chances to lose their money (if they contributed)
or to win out over others (if they did not contribute). This game
thus created a situation relevant mainly to power values that
reflect the motivation to control, win and outdo others, versus
benevolence values that reflect concern and care for ingroup
members. As predicted, contribution correlated positively with
emphasizing benevolence over power values.
The two studies further point to the mechanisms through
which values affect behavior. Study 1 investigated the impact
of the full spectrum of motivational goals, demonstrating the
usefulness of considering the tradeoffs between conflicting
motivations in predicting behavior and of relying on a
comprehensive perspective to study the impact of values. The
findings indicated that values, but not traits, affected the
participants’ contribution decision in the Paired Charity Game.
The Study thus refines our understanding of the commonalities
and differences between values and traits, and of their
distinctive impact on behavior in social dilemmas. Our
findings are consistent with Roccas et al.’s (2002) proposition,
that values predict behavior when individuals reflect on and
plan their actions.
Study 2 examined the affect of values on behavior under
low versus high accessibility. The findings indicate that
rendering values accessible strengthens their impact on
behavior. The effects of accessibility were not always as
strong as would ideally be. We reasoned that this may be, in
part, because values predicted behavior in the low accessibility
condition as well, thus limiting the effect of the interaction. To
partly overcome this limitation, we showed that the pattern of
findings was highly consistent across the three indicators of
contribution: Likelihood of contribution, likelihood of large
contribution, and average contribution.
The findings of Study 2 further point to the mechanism
through which accessible values affect behavior. We showed
that when the respondents’ value hierarchy was accessible,
they explained their choices in terms of those values that were
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(a) important to them and (b) relevant to the situation. Thus,
accessible values influence behavior by directing attention to
certain features of the situation, leading to actions that promote
goal attainment. These findings are consistent with recent
research indicating that personal values affect people’s
perceptions of their inner conflicts (Sverdlik, 2009).
Our findings also contribute to social-dilemma research.
When faced with social dilemmas, participants often act in
ways that are considered irrational (i.e., cooperate when they
could gain as much by refraining from contribution). By taking
a value perspective and considering the full spectrum of
motivational goals researchers may realize that contribution
choices are often congruent with participants’ central values
and goals, and could be therefore rational (see Camerer &
Fehr, 2006). Research on norms (e.g., Biel & Thøgersen, 2007)
suggested that when activated, norms might predict seemingly
irrational behavior. Our findings similarly suggest that when
important values are activated they yield congruent choices.
Studying the same social dilemma (e.g., prisoner dilemma) in
different contexts (e.g., the original prisoners’ context versus an
economic context of firm competition) may activate different
values and hence promote different action.
We studied actual behavior exhibited by participants in an
interpersonal or intergroup conflict. This strength is also a
limitation, however, because the behaviors studied took place
in a laboratory context. Future studies should investigate the
impact of values in real-life situations. Our findings might be
limited in other ways as well. For example, past research has
suggested that people are less likely to express value-
congruent behavior when high costs are involved or if a
strong social norm blocks the behavior (Bardi & Schwartz,
2003). Similarly, in cultures that emphasize acting upon social
norms or expectations, the relations between personal values
and behavior may be weaker than in cultures that promote
autonomous decisions. The current study examined two
Western cultures (Israel and the US); future research may
fruitfully focus on Asian collectivist cultures.
The findings of the current research also have practical
implications. Cooperation and competition could each be
beneficial, even crucial, to social groups and organizations.
Some situations call for competition (e.g., a school promoting
athletic accomplishments), whereas others require cooperation
(e.g., a community trying to preserve the environment).
Societies and organizations in them may analyze their tasks
and decide which type of behavior they would like to
encourage. They can then select or assign members based on
their values—assign individuals who emphasize power values
when competition is called for, but choose candidates who
emphasize benevolence for tasks that require teamwork and
cooperation.
Our findings further highlight the importance of making
individuals’ values accessible to them. In addition, social
leaders should consider that individuals may be unaware of the
‘‘payoff matrix’’ underlying their choices. Leaders should
therefore highlight those features in the situation that allow
individuals to express their values and attain their goals.
Consider the case of a television program that aims to raise
money to help survivors of an environmental disaster. The
organizers could first ensure that the viewers’ value hierarchies
are highly accessible to them (e.g., by having a panel
discussion on important life-goals). They can then frame the
contribution in ways that emphasize the opportunities to help
and benefit others—that is, to attain benevolence and
universalism values. Alternatively, if they wish to attract
viewers who emphasize power and achievement values, the
organizers could frame the contribution as an opportunity to
attain status and prestige. For example they can publicize the
names of those who made the largest contributions or issue
impressive certificates.
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